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The conclusion of agreements as ‘mixed’, that is jointly by the European Union
and its Member States, is a legal phenomenon peculiar to the EU legal order. It
is a consequence of the sui generis nature of the Union: unlike intergovernmental
organizations, the Union has been granted extensive internal and external
competences by the Treaties which, in certain areas, are (or may become) exclusive.
Notwithstanding the almost complete silence of the Treaties on the point, mixity
quickly became common practice for the Union and was, in most instances, readily
accepted by its contractual partners. That does not mean, however, that mixity has
not given rise, to date, to lengthy and often heated debates within, between and
before the EU institutions. The subject has also been the object of extensive study in
legal scholarship.
Essentially, two main forms of mixity are distinguished: facultative mixity and
obligatory mixity. Put simply, the former is generally associated with agreements
which cover areas of EU’s shared competences, whereas the latter is associated
with agreements which include also elements falling within the Member State’s
exclusive competences. Two recent decisions of the Court of Justice – Opinion 2/15
relating to the Free Trade Agreement (‘FTA’) with Singapore, and the judgment in
COTIF (Case C-600/14, Germany v Commission) -– deal with the above-mentioned
distinction between different forms of mixity. In that regard, that case-law raised two
main issues.
After the delivery of Opinion 2/15, many observers wondered whether the Court had:
(i) rejected the very concept of facultative mixity, in the sense that even agreements
covering (only) shared competences required mixed agreements, and (ii) regardless
of the former question, found the Singapore FTA to constitute a case of obligatory
mixity. These issues stemmed from both the manner in which the Court answered
the questions posed by the Commission and from the wording of certain key
passages of the Opinion.
To begin with, while answering in detail and with relative clarity the questions which
turned on the (EU exclusive, shared, or Member States’ exclusive) nature of the
different sets of provisions of the FTA, the Court did not expressly address the first
and more general question submitted by the Commission: ‘does the Union have
the requisite competence to sign and conclude alone the [FTA] with Singapore?’
That question thus remained to some extent unanswered. Moreover, in paragraphs
225-244 of the Opinion, the Court found that since indirect foreign investment was
neither a case of ‘a priori’ exclusive competence (it was not covered by Article 207
TFEU), nor a case of ‘supervening’ exclusive competence (the requirements of
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Article 3(2) TFEU were not met), that part of the agreement fell within the shared
competences of the Union and ‘[could not] be approved by the European Union
alone’. Finally, in paragraphs 285-293 of the Opinion, the Court also ruled that
the part of the agreement that concerned the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(‘ISDS’) regime, insofar as it removed disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the Member States, could not be established ‘without the Member States’ consent’.
That part of the agreement fell, according to the Court, not within the exclusive
competence of the Union, but within a competence shared between the Union and
the Member States.
The apparent equation made by the Court between shared competences and mixed
agreements was considered surprising (and, to some extent, troubling) by many
observers. It is indeed difficult to imagine, from a constitutional standpoint, why the
existence of a concurrent external competence by the Member States on a given
matter would inevitably require them to exercise such a competence. However, in
COTIF – a judgment delivered less than six months after Opinion 2/15 – the Grand
Chamber of the Court sought to clarify the issue. In paragraph 86 of the judgment,
the Court stated with regard to paragraph 244 of Opinion 2/15, that it had done ‘no
more than acknowledge the fact that, as stated by the Council in the course of the
proceedings relating to that Opinion, there was no possibility of the required majority
being obtained within the Council for the Union to be able to exercise alone the
external competence that it shares with the Member States in [the area of foreign
indirect investment]’. In essence, the Court had never intended to suggest that the
existence of shared competence necessarily implied the conclusion of a mixed
agreement.
Conversely, whether the Singapore FTA is a case of obligatory mixity remains, to
date, an open issue. A straightforward answer cannot be found in the Opinion: the
relevant passages are particularly succinct and not without ambiguity. There seems
to be a step in the Court’s reasoning that is missing or, at the very least, that was
made only implicitly. However, a careful reading of the Opinion may, in my view, give
some hints at what the Court possibly meant to say in that regard.
Decodifying Opinion 2/15
First, in paragraph 292, the Court rejected the idea that the provisions in the FTA
on the ISDS may be regarded as ancillary. The Court thus did not follow Advocate
General Sharpston who had taken the view that the competence with regard to
the provisions of the FTA on dispute settlement, including those on the ISDS
regime, was ‘accessory to the allocation of substantive competences’ (see points
523-536 of her Opinion). Advocate General Sharpston’s logic is clear: the power to
regulate a field cannot be limited to that of introducing substantive rules but must
necessarily encompass that of laying down rules concerning specific administrative
or judicial procedures and penalties that are necessary for the enforcement of the
substantive rules. However, in the case at hand the Court found that reasoning to
be inapplicable: the rules on the ISDS regime are not (rectius, are not only) about
investment, but they (also) affect another area of competence, thereby exceeding
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the powers granted to the Union by Articles 63 and 207 TFEU to regulate foreign
investment.
Taking that as a point of departure, the crucial issue becomes that of identifying a
second area of competence that is affected by the ISDS provisions. Yet, the only
explanation given by the Court to exclude the accessory nature of the ISDS regime
is that such a regime has the effect of ‘remov[ing] disputes from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the Member States’. How should that passage be understood? An
argument can be made that the Court referred to the fact the ISDS provisions may
have certain effects on the Member States’ judicial systems. In other words, the
Court possibly found that the creation of an international judicial or quasi-judicial
mechanism replacing, in some respects, or competing with Member States’ domestic
proceedings would be capable of altering, to an appreciable extent, the powers
of the Member States to regulate their own jurisdictional systems. If that is so,
the reason for which the ISDS regime cannot -– as the Court stated in the same
paragraph of the Opinion – ‘be established without the Member States’ consent’
becomes quite clear.
Indeed, the organisation and functioning of a Member State’s administration,
including the judiciary, is not a matter for the Union. Nowhere do the Treaties
confer on the Union any competence in that field. Rather, Article 6(e) of the FEU
Treaty only gives the Union the power ‘to carry out actions to support, coordinate
or supplement the actions of the Member States’ in the area of ‘administrative
cooperation’. Thus, if the Union has only limited competences when Member States’
administrations co-operate with each other, it may a contrario be deduced that the
Union lacks any power to regulate the way those administrations are structured and
function when acting purely internally. Accordingly, in conformity with Articles 4(1)
and 5(2) TEU, that may be a field which constitutes an exclusive competence of the
Member States.
A number of other provisions of the Treaties support that view: in particular, Articles
45(4) (carve-out for employment in the public service), 51 and 62 (carve-outs
for the exercise of official authority) TFEU. In addition, Article 298 TFEU – which
gives the EU legislature the power to establish provisions governing the ‘European
administration’ --– does not appear to constitute an adequate legal basis for rules
which concern the national administrations’ structures and functioning. With regard,
more specifically, to national judicial systems, Article 19(1) TEU provides that
‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection
in the fields covered by Union law’. This means that, with respect to fields not
covered by EU law, Member State are not under any specific obligation in that
regard (beyond, arguably, upholding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU). That
interpretation finds an echo in the works of the Convention on the Future of Europe,
in which Working Group V on Complementary Competencies took the view that ‘the
fundamental structures and essential functions of a Member State’ were among the
‘core responsibilities’ that Member States ought to retain.
The Member States’ broad powers to regulate, at the domestic level, the
administration of justice is also borne out by the Court’s consistent case-law on the
principle of procedural autonomy. According to that case-law, ‘it is for the domestic
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legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having
jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for
safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law’ (see, for example, Case
C-432/05, Unibet, paragraph 39). It may certainly be objected that the principle of
procedural autonomy is not absolute, meaning that it is only valid insofar as the
national rules are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
(principle of equivalence) and do not make it in practice impossible or excessively
difficult to exercise the rights conferred on consumers by EU law (principle of
effectiveness), and that it only applies in the absence of EU rules governing the
matter. At closer scrutiny, however, this objection can be easily overcome. On the
one hand, it is settled case-law that, even when acting in areas of their exclusive
competence, Member States should nonetheless comply with EU law (see, inter
alia, Cases C-203/80, Casati, paragraphs 27-28; and C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein,
paragraph 38). This means that, in exercising their powers, Member States cannot
breach principles or provisions of EU law which may be applicable to the situation.
On the other hand, the autonomy of the Member States to regulate certain areas
cannot prevent the Union, when acting on the basis of competences conferred
to it, from laying down common rules which may affect those areas (for example,
procedures on public procurement).
The fact that, in paragraph 293 of Opinion 2/15, the Court concluded that Section
B of Chapter 9 of the FTA (i.e. that concerning the ISDS mechanism) falls ‘within a
competence shared between the European Union and the Member States’ cannot
be read as contradicting the above. Indeed, not only the Member States but also the
Union can be party to the disputes brought under the ISDS mechanism. Therefore,
that part of the agreement impinges on the EU competences as much as on the
Member States’ competences. If this interpretation of Opinion 2/15 is correct, it
would also explain why, in COTIF, the Court qualified its statement in paragraph 244
of Opinion 2/15, but not that in paragraph 292 thereof. The requirement of Member
States’ consent to the establishment of the ISDS regime would thus seem to still
stand.
Awaiting Further Clarification
In conclusion, COTIF has made it clear that, in Opinion 2/15, the Court of Justice
had by no means intended to reject the idea of facultative mixity. Insofar as
an agreement does not include areas subject to Member States’ exclusive
competences, the EU may conclude it as EU-only or mixed, that choice normally
falling within the political discretion of the Council. However, it is far less clear
whether or not the agreement examined by the Court in the context of Opinion
procedure 2/15 is a case of obligatory mixity. It is submitted a number of textual as
well as contextual arguments support the view that that may actually be the case.
Some further clarification on this issue may perhaps come from the procedure,
currently pending before the Court, concerning certain provisions of the 2016
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (‘CETA’) between Canada of the
one part, and the European Union and its Member States of the other. Indeed, in
Opinion procedure 1/17 the Court has been asked to review the compatibility with
EU law of the ISDS mechanism provided for in that agreement. Arguably, any finding
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of the Court on that issue should mutatis mutandis be valid with regard also to the
Singapore FTA. If the Opinion of the Court is unlikely to be pronounced before 2019,
the Opinion of Advocate General Bot has been announced for 23 October of this
year. It will certainly make for interesting reading.
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